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The Early Phase of Political Party Formation in 
Post-Soviet Russia 
J.A.S. Wild 
In the process of establishing a democratic order in post-Soviet Russia, a key 
feature has been the amorphous nature of the emerging multiparty system. 
Although the initial post-Soviet reforms did see the creation of a new set of 
representative governmental institutions, the development of an effective 
multiparty system operating within those institutions has taken a lot longer. 
For the first two post-Soviet years most of the political activity focused on the 
struggle for power between the institutions themselves rather than between the 
fledgling parties in the Duma. This was a struggle between President and 
parliament and it culminated in the violent showdown at the parliament 
building in October 1993 and the subsequent elections for a new parliament and 
referendum on a new constitution in December of the same year. 
Even now, some six years later, the development of an effective multiparty 
system is still in its early stages. In the words of one analyst, Russia has 
"moved from being a one party state to a non-party state."l 
In this paper I intend to look at the early development of post-Soviet Russia's 
political party system from the appearance of quasi-political parties under 
Mikhail Gorbachev, through the post-coup break up of the Soviet Union, to the 
October crisis and December parliamentary elections and constitutional 
referendum of 1993. I will account for the fractional nature of the new parties 
and the tendency towards bloc politics, and identify the main factors that 
influenced and impeded the quick development of a strong multiparty system 
operating within the institutions of government. 
1 Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, Routledge, London, 1993, p132. 
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In so far as political parties constitute one of the key agencies for meaningful 
public participation in political life, they are an important pre-condition for the 
creation of a durable, modern civil society.2 Modern civil society as it is 
emerging in Russia encompasses a myriad of competing interest groups and I 
would contend that the emergence a multiparty political system in which strong 
parties start to compete against each other on the basis of distinct and 
reasonably consistent political platforms is one of the necessary conditions that 
will help to secure the resilience of the democratic nature of the reform process. 
From Glasnost to the Emergence of Parties. 
As Soviet society developed into a modern, complex, urban and industrial 
social organism by the 1960s, so there emerged a growing plurality of interests 
pressuring to be accommodated into the political process. The Communist 
Party ofthe Soviet Union (CPSU), hampered both by its own ideological baggage 
and by the increasingly self-serving nature of its bureaucratic oligarchy, failed to 
respond to these interests. This failure led, by the 1980s, to such a profound 
social malaise of public cynicism and apathy that the very fabric of the society 
and economy appeared to be under threat. 
The CPSU's response was glasnost, openness, which effectively took the lid off 
repressed interests which then, very quickly, formed the basis for thousands of 
new social and political movements.3 
These movements, confounding the predictions of many Western experts, 
greeted with enthusiasm President Gorbachev's challenge to take the initiative 
and responsibility for the regeneration of civil society. In the press they were 
described as "informal groups", and they marked a radical departure from the 
officially sanctioned social activity organisations. They eagerly criticised the 
state bureaucracy and government programs and, as they encountered 
bureaucratic inertia, they became increasingly politicised. Here, in these 
groups, which ranged from cultural preservation societies to ecological action 
2 See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1968, p89. 
3 It has been estimated that by the end of 1988, some 60,000 discussion groups and clubs 
were in existence across the country. 
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groups, were the manifestations of pressure for change from the grass roots of 
the body politic. 
By 1988, these informal groups, realising their common desires to combat the 
bureaucracy, began to coalesce into conglomerate organisations, which could act 
more effectively in promoting reform against the entrenched apparat. 
In the non-Russian republics these coalitions took the form of popular fronts, 
which found common cause in their opposition to Moscow. The fronts initially 
promoted ideas of national sovereignty and emphasised the importance of 
preserving the local culture and language. Later, they began to push for 
independence. In the crumbling but still Communist Party dominated Soviet 
Union of the late 1980s, these nationalist fronts in the non-Russian republics 
acted as substitutes for real political parties and, for as long as they existed, 
they inhibited the development of a genuine multiparty system. 
In Russia the national issue was a far more contentious rallying point than in 
the other republics. Democratic groups in Russia shied away from joining anti-
Soviet, pro-Russian revival fronts since, historically, Russian nationalism was 
identified with chauvinism and imperialism. As a result, the Russian based 
fronts were weak and democracy took the place of nationality politics as the 
chief mobilising force. Democratic Russia (DemRossi), which came closest to 
resembling a popular front, began in January 1990 as an umbrella organisation 
to contest the local and republican elections to be held in the spring. However, 
without the overriding unifying factor of the desire for independence, the 
ideological differences within the organisation meant that the alliance remained 
very fragile. 
By the beginning of 1990, the existence of neo-political pressure groups in 
many of the republics meant that something resembling a multiparty system 
had emerged in the Soviet Union. In view of this, the CPSU agreed to abolish 
Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which had guaranteed the CPSU's monopoly 
on power.4 Then in October 1990, the new Soviet Law on Public Associations 
4 At the February 1990 plenum, the CPSU central committee made it clear that it was 
prepared to accept the end of the party's monopoly on power. This was then enacted into 
law by the Congress of People's Deputies in March 1990. 
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legalised all of the already existing organisations and facilitated the creation of 
many new groups that then started to define themselves as political parties. 
The Decline of the CPSU and the Emergence of Other Political 
Parties. 
The CPSU itself was not immune from glasnost. For decades it had been the 
only effective channel for legitimate political expression and, as such, it was an 
essential element in the resume of all those who wished to play an active part in 
Soviet society. Consequently, its membership stretched across a broad 
spectrum of individuals and groups in society and, once the organisational 
principle of democratic centralis m had been relaxed under glasnost, a diversity 
of interests, freed from ideological cant, began to manifest itself. In advance of 
the 28th Congress of the CPSU in the summer of 1990, three "platforms" 
emerged from within the party, each publishing a competing agenda for the 
future route it should take. 5 Indeed, the party's internal divisions were 
becoming so deep that some were beginning to describe the CPSU, itself, as a 
virtual multiparty system. 
At the 28th Congress, Boris Yeltsin and other leading reformers resigned from 
the party. The previously internal rifts were now external and, with the 
communist parties in the other republics having already declared their 
independence, the shape of the CPSU and its program, blurred by ideological 
and organisational fragmentation, began to lose all focus. In the following year 
even President Gorbachev was to speak of " ... two, three or four parties 
struggling within the CPSU framework."6 
While the CPSU struggled internally, the new Soviet Law on Public 
Associations encouraged the emergence of new political formations and by early 
1991, Russia had over 100 self-declared political parties, most of them 
indistinguishable from the informal organisations they had succeeded. In the 
Soviet Union as a whole, the number of new political parties was closer to 500. 
This was evidence indeed for the CPSU that it had relinquished its monopoly 
5 For details see Alexei Leonov, A Fresh Start for Democracy, Novosti, Moscow, 1990, p. 84. 
6 Moscow News, May 12-19, 1991, p. 5. 
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hold on power.7 Of course, it still remained overwhelmingly the most powerful 
political institution in the nation and, in seeking to retain its pre-eminence, it 
began to look for potential allies amongst the new parties. 
One distinctive feature of all of the groups that the CPSU's leadership invited 
for consultations regarding the possibility of coalition government was that, at 
grass roots level where the pressure for change was being generated, they were 
politically insignificant movements. Groups with significant grass roots 
support such as the DemRossi movement and the Democratic Party of Russia, 
were ignored by the central authorities and at the same time were often 
criticised on central television and in the Communist Party press, and were 
subjected to intimidation by the state security apparatus. 
The CPSU's motives were clear. It hoped to patronise groups that, through 
their lack of popular support, posed no challenge to the CPSU's paramount 
position. By making overtures to allow for the possibility of coalition 
government with one or more of its benign "rivals", whilst simultaneously 
making life more difficult for the more popular groups, the central authorities 
were adopting tactics aimed at establishing what amounted to a fake multiparty 
system, a system that tolerated the emergence of political groups but blocked 
the creation of a viable union of opposition forces that might pose a threat to the 
CPSU's monopoly hold on power. 8 
From the Coup towards a Party System. 
Following the attempted coup of August 1991, the CPSU was outlawed and, 
very quickly, the Soviet Union began to fall apart. As a result, the evolutionary 
process within Russia's neophyte "multiparty system" underwent fundamental 
changes. 
In following de Tocqueville's maxim, "[in] politics, shared hatreds are almost 
7 For statistical details on the decline of the CPSU as an organizational force, falling 
membership figures, financial difficulties and disillusionment amongst its rank and file, 
See Sakwa, ibid p. 132-134. 
8 Vera Tolz, "Towards a Multiparty System?", in Uri Ra'anan, Keith Armes and Kate 
Martin, editors, Russian Pluralism - Now Irreversible?, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992, 
p.19-20. 
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always the basis of friendships"9, once the object of hatred disappears, so the 
reasons for friendship go with it. Such was the case in Russia, where the 
motives for cooperation between organisations in opposition to the CPSU and 
the center, disappeared after the coup. Until then many disparate groups, 
although pursuing different goals, had shared an anti-Moscow perspective that 
enabled them to coalesce and cooperate on mutually advantageous issues. The 
break up of the Soviet Union and disbanding of the CPSU resulted in a 
concomitant devaluation of commonly held notions for many of these 
organisations, and this led to an intensive regrouping of political forces. 
Issues such as state building, the pace of economic reform and the 
disintegration of the USSR rose to the forefront of the political agenda. But the 
new parties were weak and evolved and divided around these issues at a rapid 
rate, with no party emerging that looked capable of forming a government. 
Instead, coalitions and blocs formed to articulate common sets of principles and 
it was these blocs that established a modicum of stability in a very fractured 
political scene. 
Broadly speaking, four blocs of parties could be identified after the 1991 
attempted coup. The first bloc was the conservative bloc, which sought to turn 
back the clock and recreate a monolithic totalitarian type of party monopoly. 
The members of this bloc considered themselves the defenders of socialist 
principles, and they viewed Gorbachev and the new reformers as traitors to the 
socialist cause. Amongst their number they included Nina Andreeva's Stalinist 
group the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKPB), and the Russian 
Communist Workers Party (RKRP), which in an earlier guise had supported 
General Al'bert Makashov in the June 1991, Russian presidential election. 
Given the economic decline that many blamed on the reform process, the 
message of these conservative forces found some resonance in society. 
The second bloc could be described as a moderate formation but, actually, it 
was too heterogeneous to be accommodated for by a single taxonomic umbrella 
term. It was a grouping that ranged from social democrats to industrial 
corporatists to anarcho-syndicalists. Their common cause was the plight of the 
9 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835. 
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workers in the difficult period of transition from a command to a market 
economy. They did not oppose reform in itself and mostly favoured pluralist 
democracy, but it was the harsh nature of the reformers' policies that they 
criticised and, in doing so, appeared to reflect the mood of many Russians. 
The third bloc, which after the coup seemed to have the ear of the Russian 
president, looked Westward for its inspiration. Into this camp collected the out 
and out reformers, accused by their opponents of "wild privatisation" and the 
seemingly oxymoronic transgression of "market Stalinism". They were broadly 
liberal in orientation and they favoured the market, parliamentary democracy, 
ideological pluralism and minimal state intervention in the affairs of society. 
A fourth discernible bloc rallied around the ideas of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 
and could be described as neo-Slavophile, but also included monarchists. This 
bloc saw the source of a resurgent Russia in a return to traditional values, the 
reassertion of the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church and a rekindled 
sense of national identity. 
A Multiplicity of Parties Without a Multiparty System. 
Two years later the situation was even more confused and, with the state of 
the party system so unstable, any attempt at classifying the individual parties 
during this period is inevitably unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, I shall borrow 
Ronald Hill's classificatory table (table 1), which sets out an ordering of the 
major political groupings under their now five bloc headings as he perceived 
them prior to the October events of 1993. 10 The table should merely be 
regarded as a freeze frame of the shifting kaleidoscope of political groups, 
parties and coalitions at the time, but it does at least provide a picture of the 
fractious state of things. 
The proliferation of organisations calling themselves political parties was not 
the same thing as a multiparty system operating within the institutions of 
power. The weakness of parties and the shifting pattern of coalition politics 
meant that no efficient mechanism existed to channel popular feelings into 
10 Ronald Hill, "Parties and the Party System", in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi 
Gitelman, Developments in Russian & Post-Soviet Politics, Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 
102. 
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Table 1. The Russian political spectrum, 1993 
'Oppositional'parties and movements Pro- Yeltsin parties and movements 
'Patriots' , Communists' 
United 
'Centrists' 
Civic Union 
'Democratic 
Movements' 
National-
Republican 
Party of Russia 
(less than 1000) 
Opposition (bloc) (bloc) 
'Democratic 
Russia' (bloc: 
200- 300,000 
'supporters') 
Russian 
National Sobor 
(bloc) 
Russian AlI-
National Union 
(bloc) 
National 
All-Union 
Communist 
Party of 
Bolsheviks 
Labour Russia 
(bloc: up to 
100,000 
'supporters) 
Russian Party 
Salvation Front of Communists 
People's Party 
'Free Russia' 
(120,000) Democratic 
Reform 
All-Russian Movement (bloc) 
Union 'Renewal' 
(2000) 
Democratic 
Party of Russia 
(40,000) 
(bloc; 40,000 (l0,000) Constitutional 
supporters) 
Liberal-
Democratic 
Russian 
Communist 
Workers' Party 
Party (100,000, (60,000) 
independent est. 
1500) Union of 
Communists 
(10,000) 
Socialist 
Workers' Party 
(50- 80,000) 
Party of Labour 
Communist 
Party of the 
Russian 
Federation 
(500,000) 
Democratic 
Party - Party of 
Popular 
Freedom (300) 
Agrarian Party 
'Democratic 
Parties' 
Social 
Democratic 
Party (5600) 
Republican 
Party (7000) 
Free Democratic 
Party (2000) 
Constitutional 
Democratic 
Party (2000 
supporters) 
Party of 
Economic 
Freedom (600) 
People's 
Patriotic Party 
(103,000) 
Peasant Party 
(14,000) 
People's 
(Gdlyan) Party 
(10,000) 
Christian-
Democratic 
Union (5000) 
Russian 
Christian 
Democratic 
Movement 
(7000) 
Source: Based upon Spravochnik (1993). Membership estimates in brackets are generally 
self-declared; some minor blocs or parliamentary factions have been excluded; the 
Liberal-Democratic Party has been reclassified as 'patriotic'. 
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parliamentary politics. In a functional party system the parties would act to 
link the civil society and the state governing apparatus, but this wasn't 
happening. The internecine struggles between parties, within parties and 
between state institutions, also prevented the other functions of a party system 
from developing. For example, while every party produced manifestos in 
abundance, it was the government, standing, as it were, above politics, that 
formulated its own policies independent of any party. Political parties neither 
nominated the president nor formed the government and, consequently, the 
parliament and the parties in it were marginalized. 
Marginalization, the failure of parties to integrate into the operations of the 
political system and their lack of influence in the policy making process, 
threatened the stability of the new democratic institutions. From December 
1991 to October 1993, this threat took the shape of a power struggle between 
the entrenched parliamentary bodies (the Congress of People's Deputies and the 
Supreme Soviet) and the presidency, occupied by Boris Yeltsin. Disagreements 
over policy and clashes of personality escalated into an institutional battle over 
where power lay and where it ought to lie in the new Russian state framework. 
Until this issue was resolved, it was unclear what role political parties would 
play or what kind of party system would evolve. 
Factors Influencing the Evolution of Parties and the Party System. 
Underlying all of the other influential factors affecting the evolution of 
political parties and the party system was the legacy of the old regime, in which 
the CPSU had claimed absolute ideological authority and monopolised political 
power. 
One important aspect of this legacy was the stunting of the normal 
development of horizontal links between separate groups in society, and this led 
to a highly fragmented kind of social organism. In post-communist Russia this 
fragmented pattern of social interests, groups and professions, all with only 
vertical links to a now crumbling center, remained disaggregated and no 
hegemonic bloc emerged to articulate the interests of, say, labour or soldiers or 
religious groups. In other words, the fractured nature of post-communist 
society in Russia meant that parties found it difficult to root themselves in a 
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broad social base that was both ideologically consistent and distinct from the 
social bases of rival parties. The implication of this in the early period of party 
formation was that most new parties offered unstable, vague and eclectic 
programs, appealing to no distinct or specific constituencies. Political parties 
hoisted their colours declaring such idealised concepts as "world civilisation", 
"the market", "economic freedom" and "democracy", but little effort was made to 
get into understanding the details of conceptual meaning or the nitty-gritty of 
policy implementation that might lead to the realisation of these lofty 
declarations. 11 
It could be argued that the similarities in the programs of many of this first 
post-communist generation of parties pointed towards a broad social consensus. 
However, the abstract nature of the concepts that the parties appealed to meant 
that the consensus was a fatuous one, favouring little more than health, wealth 
and a good and long life for all. 
Meanwhile, Boris Yeltsin was leading a liberal, reform oriented government, 
but the reform process was not going smoothly. The attempted transformation 
of the lumbering Soviet economy was producing far more losers than winners 
and, as the crisis of the liberal reforms intensified, opposition to the reform 
process gathered. In this environment, the details of policies instead of abstract 
concepts had to be addressed. True political cleavages began to emerge over 
such issues as the nature of economic reform, the relative powers of the 
presidency and other state institutions, and the relations with the "near abroad" 
of newly independent former Soviet republics. These new cleavages began to 
undermine the simplistic consensus that had previously been prevailing. 
Another aspect of the CPSU's legacy was that it affected the nature of internal 
party organisation in the new parties. Fear of being compared to the 
communists and the rejection of Bolshevik-type sectarianism, meant that many 
parties eschewed rules for their membership. As a consequence, individuals 
who belonged to one organisation might also belong to other political groups or 
might even hold ideas diametrically opposed to the party's platform. This could 
11 One telling statistic comes from a survey in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 20, 1992, p. 1, 
which revealed that only 8% of those polled thought that any of the political parties 
reflected their views. 
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result in members of the same coalition, same party and same faction within a 
party holding opposing views on major political issues. Such internal confusion 
combined with the frequent reticence of members to take strong positions made 
it very difficult for any party to present a united and cohesive front. 
To give an example of the ramifications of the lack of cohesiveness within 
party groupings, I will look at the DemRossii movement. As I've mentioned, it 
was formed in January 1990 as an umbrella organisation to fight the up coming 
local and republican elections. Initially its leaders collaborated to achieve 
common goals, but it wasn't long before it was wracked internally by both 
political and personal divisions. In November 1991, the movement faced its 
first test of the post-coup era. At issue was the position to be taken by the 
movement in view of President Yeltsin's statement that Russia's borders with 
Kazakhstan should be redrawn to incorporate Russian communities in northern 
Kazakhstan. The points of contention were; whether or not Russia could 
legitimately make claims on territory beyond the Russian Federation, whether 
force should be used to defend the rights of Russian minorities in the newly 
independent republics, and whether such aims were consistent with the 
movement's founding principles. Disagreements opened up between the 
moderates and the more staunch nationalists and, consequently, three party 
groupings, the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), the Christian Democratic 
Movement (RCDM), and the Constitutional Democrats (CDP), withdrew from the 
movement and formed their own alliance, which they called the People's Accord 
bloc. This action then led to internal breaches within each "rebel" organisation, 
as some local chapters, angered by the unilateral decisions of their leaders, 
chose to continue supporting DemRossii in defiance of their national 
organisations. Even more confusingly, some local chapters were happy to 
support both DemRossii and the People's Accord bloc. Such fissile activity did 
not stop there, as the People's Accord alliance quickly split, with the DPR 
becoming a founding member of another coalition, the Civic Union, and the CDP 
establishing the Russian Rebirth bloc.12 
12 For more details on this, see Eric Rudenshiold and N. Catherine Barnes, "Political Party 
Development in Russia: Integration and Disintegration", in Douglas W. Blum, editor, 
Russia's Future - Consolidation or Disintegration?, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994. 
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Contributing to this fractious state of affairs was the dominance of personality 
politics, where a party was often little more than a vehicle to project the 
personality of its leader. This was in keeping with the Russian tradition of 
krugovschina - the tendency of political movements to fracture around dominant 
personalities. The DPR, led by Nikolai Travkin, was a case in point, but there 
were many others including Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party 
and the Yabloko, supporting Grigorii Yavlinskii. In general, it's clear that the 
lack of emphasis on party platforms, rules and broader political goals often led 
to parties being geared more towards the short term interests of leaders than 
towards long-term institutional viability. 
Another consequence of the CPSU experience that impacted upon the nature 
of the party system was what has been called a Russian "allergy" to the concept 
of "party". Alexander Solzhenitsyn has argued against party politics and in 
this he has reflected a general mood against the whole divisive dynamic of 
contesting party politics. In part, this has been the result of a lack of 
understanding of the role of an "opposition", since opposition in the Soviet era 
was tantamount to heresy (in fact, it was the only kind of heresy). 
Consequently, the notion that there could occur a peaceful struggle of ideas 
between parties within the framework of law and parliament was difficult to 
grasp. 
The resistance to the congealing of issues into political parties also showed 
itself in the relatively small numbers of people who joined parties. Taking 
another look at table 1, it can be seen that, with the exceptions of the fragments 
of the defunct CPSU, that is, the parties falling under the category 
"Communists", and Alexander Rutskoi's People's Party "Free Russia", - all of 
whose comparatively large membership figures, if they were to be believed, 
could be explained as remnants of the once 20 million strong membership of the 
CPSU - the memberships of even the largest of the other parties (not blocs) were 
quite small. The DPR, for example, claimed a membership of only 40,000 at 
the beginning of 1993, and DPR associations were active in just a third of 
Russia's regions. In fact, survey data indicates that no party was able to 
develop strong links with large numbers of Russian voters. In response to the 
question which political party or group from a long list was closest to their own 
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views, 41% of a mid-1992 survey group said "none" and that figure rose to 47% 
by the start of 1993.13 
The post-communist model of political parties was as electoral organisations 
focused on parliamentary life and the constituencies. The system made the 
parties territorial, forcing an increasingly regional character upon Russian 
politics and few parties achieved a nation-wide organisation. 
The sheer size and diversity of the country contributed significantly to the 
failure of new parties to develop mass national political movements. Given the 
poor state of communications and low opinion of Moscow held in the regions, it 
was doubtful whether any kind of centrally commanded party discipline could be 
maintained. On top of this, economic hardship that accompanied the Moscow 
directed reform process also meant that many local level political entities lacked 
the basic resources to co-ordinate party work. Furthermore, given the 
perception that Moscow was responsible for the rotten state of the Russian 
economy, local party formations, loath to associate themselves with the capital, 
were prepared to forsake the possibility of membership expansion that would 
come from a more national orientation. 
Coming to terms with the break-up of the Soviet Union further weakened the 
coherence of political parties since it involved that most volatile of concepts, the 
idea of nation. 
The loss of territory and sudden rupture of traditional Russian communities, 
which had such a traumatic effect upon the Russian people, was a source of 
contention which all of the parties in the political spectrum were able to tap into 
to criticise each other. The national-patriotic parties, who promoted some form 
of restoration of the Soviet Union, were perceived by the reformers as 
threatening the stability of the post-communist order since stability was 
predicated on the development of the statehood of a smaller Russia. On the 
other hand, the parties espousing a new Russian based polity were open to 
charges of betraying the motherland and abandoning ethnic Russians "abroad". 
This issue crosscut other defining party cleavages and consequently inhibited 
the consolidation of parties and further undermined the possibility of a 
13 Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, p. 130. 
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democratic community being built upon a social consensus. 
Another strong inhibition to the emergence of a party system was Yeltsin's 
presidential style of government. "Man of the people" Boris had haughtily 
declared himself above politics and refused to create a presidential party, stating 
that "My support is the Russian people."14 Accordingly, he had selected a 
government chosen on a non-party basis. Such a presidential system clearly 
diminished the role that political parties were able to perform and was quite 
different to the parliamentary systems prevalent in Western Europe, where 
mandated parties, either singly or in coalition, would form governments to 
frame legislation in keeping with their manifestos. 
Under Yeltsin's presidential system, party political programs became 
something of an irrelevance. Yeltsin looked to all parties and even outside of 
the party system to form his governing "team". A result ofthis marginalization 
was that the parties were deprived of the skills of many of "the best and the 
brightest", who were far more inclined to devote their energies to working with 
the real power actors in the state administrative structures than waste their 
time promoting vague political principles off in the wings away from the 
political main stage. 
It was only after Yeltsin's power weakened, as he grappled with an 
adversarial parliament through the autumn of 1992, that he conceded the need 
to build support for his embattled reform program among the parliamentary 
factions. To this end, he endorsed a new bloc, Democratic Choice, which 
incorporated the old DemRossii movement and was intended to act as a 
counterweight to his opponents in the parliament. However, Yeltsin devoted 
little time to this bloc and little effort was spent building up its organisational 
resources. 
Post-October '93 - the December Elections and Mterwards. 
For all of the reasons laid out above, it seems reasonable to conclude that up 
until the crisis of October 1993, while parties and party leaders existed in 
abundance, there was no party system. 
14 Quoted at a press conference given on August 21, 1992. 
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The October violence at the Russian parliament building proved to be a 
watershed in the development of the party system. For a start, it forcibly broke 
the impasse between president and parliament, which had been the dominant 
feature in the political landscape since early in 1992, when Yeltsin's 
government, accepting the theoretical framework of certain American 
economists, had launched a series of radical economic reforms known 
collectively as "shock therapy". In response, the parliament had rallied to 
oppose these same reforms and had attempted to usurp the powers of the 
president. This struggle for power between the institutions of government had 
largely blocked the emergence of party based political struggles over policy. 
The October events also paved the way for parliamentary elections, which, by 
their very nature, would take politics from the corridors and smoke filled rooms 
of the state buildings back out into the open. A competitive, party based 
election campaign could establish exactly which parties and which policies 
enjoyed genuine support in the country. At the same time, the referendum for 
a newly devised constitution in which the relative powers of the different 
branches of government would be clearly defined offered the prospect of creating 
a more stable foundation for the structure of government institutions. This, it 
was hoped, would lessen the likelihood of a recurrence of the autumn power 
struggle, which was, in part, born of the existing ambiguous and oft revised 
Brehznev era constitution. 
Tempered in the crucible of popular elections and with the prospect of 
institutional stability, the chances of a more coherent party system emerging 
seemed good. 
As expected, with the elections approaching, party leaders were forced to 
define their positions with greater precision in order to present distinct 
identities. The election campaign also witnessed attempts to establish credible 
policy-based coalitions that could, potentially, lead to party mergers. 
At the start of the campaign, there were 21 parties or electoral blocs. 
However, in order to avoid the risks to stability that a highly fragmented 
political contest would entail. President Yeltsin decreed restrictions upon 
organisations that could not demonstrate broad appeal (by mustering at least 
100,000 signatures spread across several provinces). This encouraged 
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consolidation and ensured that, in the end, only 13 distinct political 
organisations were registered for the elections. 
The new, post-coup, parliamentary institutions and electoral system also 
aimed to achieve some degree of consolidation. The December 1993 
Constitution aimed to establish a new national parliament, the Federal 
Assembly, within which the parties would be operating. The parliament was 
designed to have two chambers, with the stronger, lower chamber, the State 
Duma, having half of its 450 seats filled by proportional representation from 
parties electoral lists (the other half to be decided by traditional, single member 
district contests). Such a list system gave party organisations a whip hand 
under which the threat of exclusion from the list exerted a certain degree of 
discipline upon the party candidates to conform to their respective parties' 
manifestos. A 5% threshold level for parliamentary representation on the basis 
of party lists was another consolodation measure, designed to limit the number 
of small parties that would exist in the new parliament. 
However, despite these measures aimed at encouraging consolidation, the new 
constitution, by formalising the type of strongly centralised presidential rule 
that Boris Yeltsin was already practising, could not be considered a constitution 
devised to promote a strong party system. In fact, it could more readily be 
considered a deliberate attempt to weaken the party arena, parliament, so that 
political power could not be wielded by an institution whose post-Soviet track 
record was of instability and fragmentation. 
The elections saw the President's administration represented by Russia's 
Choice, an evolution of Democratic Choice, headed by Yegor Gaidar. Its 
candidates included most members of the government, including Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Privatisation Minister Anatolii Chubais and Finance 
Minister Boris Fedorov. Yeltsin, himself, however, remained aloof and refused 
to endorse any party directly. 
Despite the tendency towards consolidation, party cleavages still did not 
necessarily conform to policy positions and, in addition to Russia's Choice, 
several other pro-reform groups fielded candidates. St. Petersburg mayor, 
Anatoli Sobchak headed the Democratic Reform movement, and Yabloko, was 
focused around the economist Grigorii Yavlinskii. Russian Unity and Concord 
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Table 2. Parties, Groups and Blocs in the Federal Assembly, as a result of the 
December 1993 elections 
State Duma (Lower House) Seats 
Russia's Choice (radical reformist) 76 
New Regional Policy (centrist) 65 
Liberal Democratic Party (extreme nationalist) 63 
Agrarian Party of Russia (procommunist) 55 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 45 
Party of Russian Unity and Concord (moderate reformist with strong regional 30 policy) 
Russian Way (Russian nationalist) 25 
Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc (moderate reformist) 25 
Women of Russia (centrist) 23 
Democratic Party of Russia (centrist) 15 
Union of December 12th (radical reformist) 12 
Council of the Federation (Upper House) 
Pro-reform democrats 48 
- Russia's Choice 40 
- Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc 3 
- Party of Russian Unity and Concord 4 
- Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms 1 
Moderate reformers 23 
Centrist opposition to the government 36 
The communist and socialist opposition 20 
- Communist Party of the Russian Federation 15 
- Agrarian Party of Russia 3 
- Socialist Workers' Party 1 
- Labour Party 1 
Extreme nationalists 2 
- Cossacks'movement in Kuban 1 
- Russian National Council 1 
Source: Adapted from Thomas F. Remington, "Representative Power and the Russian State", 
in Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi Gitelman, Developments in Russian & Post-
Soviet Politics, Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 83. 
-21-
was another pro-reform party that aimed to represent the "real interests" of 
Russia's regions and was favoured by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. 
The other groupings were, essentially, the opposition. The ultra nationalist 
Liberal Democratic Party, under Vladimir Zhirinovskii, was neither liberal nor 
democratic. Women of Russia was an anti-market feminist bloc. The 
Democratic Party of Russia, which had re-established its autonomy, remained a 
vehicle for Nikolai Travkin's ego. The Agrarian Party reflected the interests of 
state and collective agriculture rather than private agriculture. Finally, there 
was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which was the only post-
CPSU grouping allowed to compete since other post-CPSU groups had been 
banned in the wake of the October events, forcing their members to stand as 
independents. 
The election's results gave Zhirinovskii's party a surprising first, with 23% of 
the vote, followed by Russia's Choice with 15%, the Communists with 12%, and 
the Agrarians, Women of Russia and Yabloko all with about 8% each. (See 
table 2) 
Overall, parties more left-wing and nationalist than the government gained 
57% of the vote, while the dominant party of government, Russia's Choice, even 
when pooled with the other reform parties, could only muster about 30% of the 
vote. Assuming that many of the independents were also opponents of reform, 
the new parliament seemed hardly any more predisposed towards Yeltsin's 
policies than the old one. So, despite the fact that the new constitution had 
passed with 52% of the popular vote, the stage appeared set for a continued 
struggle between the President and the state legislature and the likelihood was 
that parliamentary party politics would once more be consigned to the wings. 
Post-election stabilization. 
After the December 1993 elections, political parties still had no real role in the 
exercise of power. They still had trouble exerting party discipline over their 
members in parliament and they had little or no control over their members in 
government. In fact, although the December '93 elections forced parties to 
organise, define and consolidate themselves, the post-election period saw a 
return of the pre-October blight of ego driven micro-factionalism. This should 
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not come as a surprise since most of the earlier conditions inhibiting party 
development remained in effect. Yet, despite the still fragmented state of party 
politics, in fact, in the first year after the elections, the Russian political scene 
stabilised and this could be attributed to the influence of the new constitution. 
Even though the new presidential republic had a new parliament dominated by 
Yeltsin's opponents and pessimists predicted a paralysed body politic, in 
practice, a rough but workable system of checks and balances seemed to emerge. 
Power clearly favoured the president while parliament was the weakest of the 
power centres. The finance minister, Boris Fedorov, likened the Lower House 
deputies to "cockroaches running around in a glass jar, achieving nothing."15 
That notwithstanding, the new Duma at least appeared to be functioning better 
than the old one, it bickered less and legislated more. However, the price of 
stability appeared to be the triumph of the executive over the legislature, and 
this cast doubt on how far Russia had gone in overcoming its authoritarian 
traditions and building a law based democratic state. 
15 Quoted in The Economist, June 25,1994, p. 47. 
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